The effect and risks of ECB collateral framework changes by Blot, Christophe et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effects and risks 
of ECB collateral 
framework changes 
Monetary Dialogue July 2018 
Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies  
Authors: Christophe Blot and Paul Hubert 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies 
PE 619.019 – June 2018 EN 
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 
Requested by the ECON committee 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to 
face increased liquidity needs of commercial banks. This has 
taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different 
classes of assets has been reduced and the haircut associated to 
these assets has evolved conditional on the default risks of these 
assets. The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and 
enhancing monetary policy transmission have most probably 
exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance sheet 
and potential capital losses. 
This document was provided by Policy Department A at the 
request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. 
 
The effects and risks 
of ECB collateral 
framework changes 
Monetary Dialogue July 2018 
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs. 
 
 
AUTHORS 
Christophe BLOT, Sciences Po – OFCE & Université Paris-Nanterre – EconomiX 
Jérôme CREEL, Sciences Po – OFCE & ESCP Europe 
Paul HUBERT, Sciences Po – OFCE 
 
ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE  
Dario PATERNOSTER 
 
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT  
Janetta CUJKOVA 
 
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 
Original: EN 
 
 
 
 
ABOUT THE EDITOR 
Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other 
parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU internal 
policies. 
 
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe for updates, please write to:  
Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
European Parliament 
B-1047 Brussels 
Email: Poldep-Economy-Science@ep.europa.eu  
 
Manuscript completed in June 2018 
© European Union, 2018 
 
This document is available on the internet at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.html 
 
 
DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT 
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.  
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is 
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. 
The effects and risks of ECB collateral framework changes 
 
PE 619.019 3 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 4 
LIST OF FIGURES 5 
LIST OF TABLES 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 
 INTRODUCTION 7 
 THE NEW ECB’S COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK 9 
 THE EFFECTS OF COLLATERAL CHANGES 16 
 THE RISKS ASSOCIATED TO COLLATERAL CHANGES 20 
 CONCLUSION 22 
REFERENCES 23 
 
  
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
 4 PE 619.019 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ABS 
ACC 
Asset-backed securities 
Additional Credit Claims 
ECB European Central Bank 
ELA 
EONIA 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
Euro overnight interest rate average 
LTRO Long Term Refinancing Operations 
MRO Main Refinancing Operations 
SME Small and medium-sized enterprises 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
The effects and risks of ECB collateral framework changes 
 
PE 619.019 5 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Composition of the Eurosystem balance sheet (Assets) 10 
Figure 2: Ratings for sovereign bond yields at 10-year maturity 14 
Figure 3: Variation in the value of euro area collateral 15 
Figure 4: Credit dynamics for newly eligible firms 17 
Figure 5: Impact of the ACC programme on interest rates to newly eligible firms 18 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Assets eligible as collateral by selected central banks 11 
 
 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
 
 6 PE 619.019 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
• Any collateral framework induces a trade-off between the central bank role of lender of last resort 
and the risk held in the central bank balance sheet. 
• The collateral framework is also essential to the transmission of monetary policy as it sets the rules 
for the refinancing operations of commercial banks. 
• One specificity of the Eurosystem collateral framework, even in normal times, is to accept a large 
range of assets as collateral, including non-marketable ones. This is due to heterogeneity of 
banking systems across the euro area countries and because of the importance of banks in the 
transmission of monetary policy (compared to the US for instance).  
Aim  
• During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to face increased liquidity needs of 
commercial banks. 
• This has taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different classes of assets has been 
reduced and the haircut associated to these assets has evolved conditional on the default risks of 
these assets. 
• According to recent empirical evidence, this loosening of the collateral constraint has supported 
bank lending and reduced financing costs for firms for which credit claims were eligible.  
• If ECB’s counterparties default, accepting a larger set of assets as collateral puts the ECB balance 
sheet at risk. However, the adjustment of haircuts aims at mitigating this risk.  
• In addition, central banks do not face liquidity crisis like commercial banks as they issue the legal 
tender and may continue their activity even if they have negative equity. 
• The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing monetary policy transmission 
have most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance sheet and potential 
capital losses.  
The effects and risks of ECB collateral framework changes 
 
PE 619.019 7 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The implementation of monetary policy involves liquidity operations by which the Eurosystem 
provides refinancing to eligible counterparties against eligible collateral; which are assets pledged to 
protect its balance sheet against the risk of default of the borrower (counterparty risk). The collateral is 
accepted at market prices subject to a haircut. Until the crisis, the issue of collateral was mainly 
technical and did not really matter for the monetary policy stance. The amount of liquidity provided by 
the Eurosystem was set to bring the EONIA (Euro overnight interest rate average) rate close to the 
target rate. The policy rate signalled the stance of monetary policy and liquidity operations were geared 
at restricting fluctuations of the EONIA around the target rate.  
The financial crisis has made those issues crucial since the separation principle, according to which 
monetary and liquidity management policies are distinct, could no longer hold (Bordes and Clerc, 
2012). Indeed, the European Central Bank implemented various non-standard policies following the 
financial crisis ranging from extended liquidity provisions and asset purchases to forward guidance. 
Liquidity operations have not only contributed to address banks’ fragilities – the standard lender of last 
resort operations – but they have also improved monetary policy channels of transmission by allowing 
commercial banks to use a larger set of corporate loans and lower-rated assets as guarantees when 
they borrow from the Eurosystem. While collaterals address issues of asymmetric information and 
moral hazard, their supply is not deprived of those issues.  For this reason, higher haircuts were applied 
to insure the central bank against liquidity risk and a potentially larger variance of lower-rated asset 
prices. 
The central bank sets a collateral framework defining the set of eligible assets and their associated 
haircuts. When financial stress and information asymmetry between banks are high, the liquidity of the 
interbank market is low, so short-term funding may be sharply reduced in the banking system. To 
mitigate or avoid a liquidity freeze and the subsequent credit crunch, the central bank usually acts as a 
lender of last resort, lending central bank reserves (the monetary base or high-powered money) to 
banks against guarantees, referred to as collateral. However, when financial stress is high, the value of 
eligible assets (the collateral) may decline because of lower valuations and rating downgrades. The 
adaptation of the ECB’s collateral framework was therefore necessary to provide liquidity to 
KEY FINDINGS 
During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to face increased liquidity needs of 
commercial banks. This has taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different classes of 
assets has been reduced and the haircut associated to these assets has evolved conditional on 
the default risks of these assets. 
If ECB’s counterparties default, accepting a larger set of assets as collateral put the ECB balance 
sheet at risk. However, the adjustment of haircuts aims at mitigating this risk. In addition, central 
banks do not face liquidity crisis like commercial banks as they issue the legal tender and may 
continue their activity even if they have negative equity. 
The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing monetary policy transmission 
have most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance sheet and 
potential capital losses. 
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commercial banks. Besides, the amount of eligible collateral had become the only limit for access 
funding after the ECB decided to conduct its liquidity operations at fixed-rate and full allotment. All 
demand from commercial banks were satisfied insofar as they were able to present enough collateral 
to be pledged against refinancing. 
During the crisis, the ECB decided to accept a wider set of assets as collateral through the Additional 
Credit Claims (ACC) programme in December 2011, after the introduction of the “long-term refinancing 
operations” (LTROs) of three year maturities. The measure aimed to ensure that commercial banks had 
enough collateral to borrow at this maturity. Besides, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) has been 
provided by national central banks with the approval of the ECB against collateral that does not meet 
the ECB’s collateral standard. This raises the question of potential losses. The decision to lend against 
riskier collateral or to weaker counterparties may have increased the risk borne by the national central 
bank. 
Based on the trade-off induced by the collateral framework, this policy brief deals with two issues. It 
assesses the extent to which  collateral policy actually complemented other decisions to ease the 
stance of monetary policy and it discusses whether additional risks that have been taken by central 
banks put a strain on their solvency. 
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 THE NEW ECB’S COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK 
Before the crisis, the ECB monetary policy was mainly running through the lending of central bank 
money (reserves) to commercial banks at fixed maturities – one week for the Main Refinancing 
Operations (MRO) and three months for the Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) – and at a 
variable interest rate against collateral. During the crisis, the ECB extended the maturity of these 
liquidity provisions and satisfied all liquidity needs at fixed rate in order to deal with the liquidity 
squeeze in the wholesale market. The main component responsible for the increase in the size of the 
ECB balance sheet until March 2015 was these liquidity operations – called “Lending to euro area credit 
institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro” in the Eurosystem’s balance 
sheet – for which collateral is needed (see Figure 1). Open market operations are the key operational 
framework to implement monetary policy in the euro area. Lending to credit institutions requires 
adequate collateral (assets pledged as security) to protect the central bank’s balance sheet against the 
risk of default by the borrower (credit risk or counterparty risk). The ECB counterpart is the commercial 
bank that receives liquidity. The bank is required to reimburse the liquidity after a given period, at 
which point it will recover its collateral. When the commercial bank is unable to repay the loan, the ECB 
uses this collateral to prevent a loss.  
The definition of eligible collateral matters for commercial banks as it limits the amount of refinancing 
they can get from the Eurosystem. The ECB introduced a list of eligible collateral in January 2007. Its 
principal aim is to protect the balance sheet of the ECB, its shareholders – generally national 
government – and ultimately taxpayers against excessive risks. The aim of the collateral framework is 
to define which assets can provide an adequate protection against losses to the ECB and national 
central banks, and in the meantime enough eligible collateral so that commercial banks can access 
central bank liquidity programme.1 Adequate access to ECB liquidity plays a central role for commercial 
banks. Even in normal times, they often need access to central bank liquidity for their daily operations. 
It becomes even more crucial in crisis period when the interbank market is freezing as commercial 
banks refuse to lend to each other.2 The reserves supplied by the central bank are therefore the only 
source of funding. The amount of available collateral limits the quantity of reserves that can be 
borrowed. 
 
                                                             
1  The framework is defined in the ECB document ‘The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area: General 
documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy instruments and procedures’ and subsequent updates 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/gendoc201102en.pdf ). 
2  Operations on the interbank market are generally not guaranteed by a collateral. 
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Figure 1: Composition of the Eurosystem balance sheet (Assets) 
 
Source: ECB. 
 
Table 1 presents the different collateral frameworks of selected central banks. The ECB accepts a large 
range of assets at a lower quality range compared to the other central banks. It comprises market-
traded assets, which are listed in the eligible asset database updated by the ECB on a daily basis. This 
category notably includes euro area government bonds. One specificity shared by the ECB and the 
Bank of Japan is to accept non-marketable assets, such as bank loans (credit loans) to firms, as collateral. 
Credit claims represent a large share of the collateral accepted by the Eurosystem. Between 2007 and 
2011, the share of non-marketable assets over total collateral went from 3% to 23% (see Bignon et al., 
2016). In contrast, the Federal Reserve provides liquidity to the US banking system only against 
government bonds and bonds of public sector institutions. However, the euro area banking system is 
bigger than the US one, and it is also more heterogeneous.  
The main two criteria for a collateral framework are the definition of the type of assets that are 
acceptable as collateral, the minimum rating of the asset and the haircut applied to the market value 
of the asset. Liquidity is provided conditional on the market value of the collateral, but lower rated 
collaterals are associated to a bigger haircut to compensate for higher default risks and/or higher risks 
of changes in valuation. For instance, sovereign debt rated AAA with a maturity of 3 years would only 
be subject to a haircut of 2% whereas sovereign debt rated around BBB would be subject to a haircut 
of 10%.  
Prior to the crisis, the ECB’s collateral framework was criticised for reducing liquidity risk premia and 
thereby contributing to the insufficient differentiation of sovereign risk. Buiter and Sibert (2005) 
suggested that the similar collateral treatment of Eurosystem’s sovereign debt was responsible for the 
low spreads in the euro area sovereign yields. More specifically, they criticised the fact that all sovereign 
debts were accepted with the same haircut despite the differences between sovereign yield ratings.  
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Table 1: Assets eligible as collateral by selected central banks 
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Source: European Central Bank (2013) Collateral eligibility requirements: a comparative study across specific frameworks, July. 
 
During the recent financial crisis and after the ECB changed all three criteria of its collateral framework, 
the role of the collateral system has also been criticized for allowing the financing of capital 
withdrawals from periphery countries to core countries. However, without this reduction in the 
minimum required standards, commercial banks in a number of countries would have been without 
access to the ECB liquidity window. Ultimately, the decision to stop granting liquidity to commercial 
banks in a country of the monetary union is outside the scope of monetary policy. Therefore, the 
question today is whether this change in the collateral framework on one side helped commercial 
banks to access funds and to avoid a credit crunch, and on the other side, induced the ECB to take 
excessive risks in its balance sheet. 
The changes in the ECB collateral policy were necessary to fulfil its treaty-based mandate of providing 
liquidity to solvent banks and safeguarding financial stability. Because the collateral framework gives 
access to central bank liquidity, it plays an important role in the setting and in the channels of 
transmission of monetary policy.  The ECB modified its rating standards together with the haircuts 
applied to the different collateral assets. Because the highest rated assets were scarcer, the ECB reduced 
the minimum required rating. In order to match the higher risks borne by the ECB, it also increased the 
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haircut for this newly eligible collateral. Below is a list of more detailed changes in the ECB’s collateral 
framework:  
1. Before the crisis: credit rating threshold at A– for all eligible collateral (except ABS for which the 
credit rating threshold is at AAA). 
2. 15 October 2008: credit rating threshold of all eligible collateral (except ABS) lowered to BBB– 
“temporarily” (ECB/2008/13).  
3. 8 April 2008: the previous measure is made permanent (ECB/2011/14). 
4. 8 December 2011: credit rating threshold of ABS based on residential mortgages only or loans to 
SMEs only decreased to A– (ECB/2011/25). Often referred as to the Additional Credit Claims (ACC) 
framework. 
5. 20 June 2012: credit rating threshold of ABS based on auto loans, leasing, commercial mortgages, 
consumer finance, residential mortgages and loans to SMEs decreased to BBB– 
6. 9 July 2014: credit threshold of ABS based on auto loans, leasing, commercial mortgages, consumer 
finance, residential mortgages, loans to SMEs or credit card receivables reduced to BBB– 
(ECB/2014/31). 
Most assets are now accepted as adequate collateral when their credit rating is above BBB– 
corresponding to the investment grade. This change was essential for the ECB to keep on accepting 
sovereign bonds issued by most euro area countries that had suffered from ratings downgrades (figure 
2). During that time, the ECB also changed the haircut applied to the different types of collateral. First, 
the haircuts for high-rated bank bonds and ABS were increased to 12.5 % and 16 % respectively in 
September 2010 (for a residual maturity of 5-7 years). At the same date, the haircut for low-rated bank 
bonds (BBB+ to BBB–) reached 37%. Depending on the rating applied to these assets, the haircut 
applied to bank bonds and ABS also changed during the course of the financial crisis. Second, for 
government bonds, the haircut was modified only slightly. Before the crisis only high-rated 
government debt (A- at minimum) were accepted as collateral with a haircut of 3% (for a residual 
maturity of 5-7 years). Lower-rated government bonds became eligible on October 2008 with a haircut 
of 8%. In September 2013, these haircuts were changed to 2% and 10% respectively for high-rated and 
lower-rated government bonds. However, Greek government bonds became eligible even below the 
BBB- minimum rating subject to a special haircut in December 2012. 
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Figure 2: Ratings for sovereign bond yields at 10-year maturity 
 
Source: Barthélemy, Bignon and Nguyen (2018). Note: The vertical lines show (1) the first three-year LTRO of 21 December 
2011, (2) the second three-year LTRO of 28 February 2012, (3) the announcement of the OMT programme on 2 August 2012, 
(4) the decision to launch the PSPP on 22 January 2015. 
 
Not only does the list of eligible assets matter but also the value of the collateral that may be used. This 
value indeed changes according to the haircut set by the ECB but also with the value of assets. In 2011, 
the eligible collateral amounted to €14 trillion, the largest part of it being central government bonds. 
During the sovereign debt crisis in 2011/2012, the price of sovereign bonds – mainly Italian, Spanish, 
Portuguese, Irish and Greek bonds – have sharply decreased leading to huge losses in the value of 
collateral (figure 3). The implementation of the ACC programme has then enabled to enlarge the list of 
assets, which improved the value of disposable collateral. Besides, the allocation of ECB liquidity 
changed substantially during the crisis to go to the banking systems of weaker countries. The share of 
the liquidity provided to banks in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland represents 80% of the total 
liquidity provided by the ECB. In these countries, because the credit rating of assets held by commercial 
banks dropped significantly, the ECB was not able to provide as much liquidity to the banking system 
as needed. The Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) was therefore put in place. National central banks 
are then able to provide liquidity to banks resident in the country against lower quality collateral after 
the approval of the ECB governing council. 
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Figure 3: Variation in the value of euro area collateral 
 
Source: Barthélemy, Bignon and Nguyen (2018). 
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 THE EFFECTS OF COLLATERAL CHANGES 
Commercial banks that decide to supply credit (or expand their assets) do not need resources ex-ante 
but have to adjust assets and liabilities ex-post. Consequently, the day-to-day business may generate 
situation of liquidity shortages or excess liquidity. Usually, these imbalances are settled on the 
interbank market where banks with excess liquidity lend to banks with liquidity needs for short period 
without guarantees. During the crisis, the interbank market froze because of a generalized loss of 
confidence. Banks with excess liquidity became reluctant to lend and preferred to deposit these 
liquidities at the ECB, hence constraining banks with liquidity shortage to also turn to the Eurosystem 
to ask for refinancing. However, operations with the Eurosystem needs to be collateralized. The amount 
of refinancing was henceforth crucially determined by the value of assets that could be pledged as 
collateral. This was even the only limit when the ECB decided to allocate liquidity at fixed rate with full 
allotment. The credit supply of banks could therefore become constrained. 
Cahn, Duquerroy and Mullins (2017) and Mésonnier, O’Donnell and Toutain (2017) conducted two 
recent studies in order to investigate the impact of the ACC programme on bank credit supply to 
French firms. The first study measures the effects of the ACC on lending to independent SMEs and 
highlights the importance of the bank-firm relationship in the transmission. The second study 
quantifies the impact of the measure on the interest rate of loans offered to newly eligible firms and 
shows that the transmission is stronger for banks that pledge higher shares of corporate loans as part 
of their collateral. Overall, these studies are supportive of an active collateral channel of monetary 
policy transmission which allows the central bank to affect banks’ funding costs independently of its 
decision to change its policy rate. 
Looking first at quantities lent to small and medium-size standalone firms, Cahn, Duquerroy and 
Mullins (2017) find evidence that collateral policy measures can be an effective tool to support bank 
lending to SMEs and reduce contagion during times of financial distress (figure 4). The main hypothesis 
is that the ACC programme, by targeting the loans of specific firms, acts to reduce banks’ marginal costs 
in funding these loans. Banks should then adjust their corporate lending portfolio in favour of these 
newly eligible firms, thereby improving the financial outcomes of these firms. 
The main result is that newly eligible, standalone SMEs experienced an 8% increase in borrowed credit, 
relative to non-eligible, but otherwise similar SMEs, in the year following the policy. These firms also 
experienced lower likelihoods of payment defaults to suppliers (-1.5% of the amount of payables) and 
credit rating downgrades relative to those who did not. Interestingly, this effect is strongly driven by 
firms with single bank relationships. There is also suggestive evidence that during 2011, single-bank 
firms were substantially more credit constrained than firms with multi-bank relationships. 
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Figure 4: Credit dynamics for newly eligible firms 
 
Source: Cahn, Duquerroy and Mullins (2017). Note: This chart plots the average growth rate in credit for firms that became 
eligible in February 2012 against ineligible firms rated one notch lower. The sample consists of independent, single-bank 
French SMEs.  
 
The results also reveal the transmission of the programme based on firm balance sheet characteristics. 
The effect is driven by single-bank firms with stronger lending relationships, and stronger observable 
characteristics, such as low leverage and high levels of tangible assets. 
Mésonnier, O’Donnell and Toutain (2017) show that collateral eligibility may also impact banks’ loan 
supply due to their demand for pledgeable collateral (see figure 5). As a consequence, the loans of 
eligible firms may benefit from a relative reduction in their interest rates, an effect dubbed by the 
authors the “eligibility discount”. The authors find robust evidence of an eligibility discount for newly 
eligible, medium-quality firms. On average the relative loan spread offered to these firms decreased by 
7 basis points due to the programme relative to slightly higher quality eligible firms. Although they 
argue that it may look small in absolute terms, this reduction amounts to one third of the ex-ante 
average difference in interest rates between newly eligible firms and similar firms just one credit-notch 
above. Furthermore, the authors find that this eligibility discount is associated with a relative increase 
in the quantity of credit lent to firms affected by the programme. The combination of both a lower 
interest rate and an increase in the quantity lent is indicative that the ACC programme succeeded in 
supporting bank credit supply. 
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Figure 5: Impact of the ACC programme on interest rates to newly eligible firms 
 
Source: Mésonnier, O’Donnell and Toutain (2017). Note: This chart plots the average spreads for firms which are eligible (4) for 
the ACC programme compared to firms already eligible (4+) and firms which are never eligible (5+). 
 
Next, the authors examine how the effect of the programme differs across banks. There are several 
reasons why banks may react differently to the programme. Firstly, banks may have different liquidity 
or collateral needs, therefore banks which are more constrained ought to benefit more from the 
programme. Secondly, some banks may find it more advantageous to pledge credit claims as collateral 
rather than marketable assets. This may reflect differences in business models or informational 
advantages in issuing loans. The authors find that the average eligibility discount is mainly driven by 
the response of the banks which, prior to the programme, pledged higher shares of credit claims as 
part of their collateral with the Eurosystem. By contrast, no effect is found that results from banks' ex-
ante capitalisation, or from the collateral-strain potentially induced by their LTRO-uptakes. This 
suggests that it is the banks that faced the lowest opportunity cost in pledging credit claims which 
benefited the most from the programme. 
Together, these studies show that an extension of eligible collateral to the loans of firms, most of which 
are SMEs, enhances the monetary policy transmission channel by allowing these firms to borrow more 
and at cheaper rates. However, collateral policy not only affects the assets which become eligible, but 
also the counterparties which hold these assets. Therefore, an active collateral policy can be an effective 
alternative tool for reducing banks funding costs, especially at times when conventional monetary 
policy hits its zero-lower bound. 
This effect of collateral policy on credit supply is all the more important in the euro area where banking 
credit represents the bulk of firms’ funding, notably for SMEs. As highlighted above, the measures taken 
during the crisis have improved funding liquidity, the liquidity of the liability side of commercial banks’ 
balance sheet, making expansionary policy powerful. Yet, collateral policy may have also improved the 
liquidity of assets held by commercial banks. By allowing a large set of assets to be used as collateral in 
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liquidity operations, the ECB has made those assets more liquid since banks had the ability to trade 
them. This may have supported the asset price enhancing the monetary policy transmission. 
Changes in haircuts may also have some impact on collateral values of the assets. Corradin and 
Rodriguez-Moreno (2016) notably show that increases in haircuts applied by the Eurosystem 
significantly decrease the price of eligible public bonds, whereas decreases in haircuts have no 
conclusive impact. The increase in haircuts might thus mitigate the impact of the extension of 
collaterals on asset prices.  
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 THE RISKS ASSOCIATED TO COLLATERAL CHANGES 
Central banks are public institutions which may be seen as independent public agencies. They have 
been assigned objectives and are held accountable for their decisions. As members of decision-making 
body of central banks are non-elected personalities, they are not allowed to take fiscal decisions. Net 
earnings are transferred to their own government and losses should be backed by their government. 
To avoid losses and cost for the taxpayer, central banks generally endeavor to take minimum risks in 
the conduct of their operations related to the implementation of monetary policy. It explains why they 
protect themselves against the credit risk – if a counterparty bank is unable to repay the loans – by 
requiring appropriate collateral. Thus, if the counterparty fails, the central bank will recover the value 
of its loan by selling the collateral. As the value of this collateral is adjusted by a haircut, the total 
amount of collateral pledged at the central bank should exactly match the value of the loan. Yet, there 
may be differences ex-post and the counterparty risk becomes a market risk but it is still supposed to 
be minimized. 
During the crisis, the Eurosystem has allowed riskier assets to be used as collateral. At several occasions, 
it has reduced the minimum of the credit rating threshold. This may have encouraged struggling banks 
to borrow against poor quality collateral (Drechsler et al., 2016) and Nyborg (2015)3. Consequently, the 
balance sheet of the Eurosystem may have become riskier. However, Bindseil et al. (2017) shows that 
these claims are exaggerated. Besides, central banks do not operate like commercial banks and do not 
face the same risk of bank run. Bank runs occur when agents fear insolvency or if they believe that other 
agents fear a risk of insolvency. Banks are then prone to self-fulling crisis as explained by Diamond & 
Dybvig (1983). As their assets are illiquid, they cannot satisfy all deposit withdrawals and can be forced 
to bankruptcy. Such a run occurred in the wholesale market in 2008 after the Lehman Brother collapse. 
The interbank market froze indicating that banks were suddenly unable to borrow from other banks. 
No other bank was willing to refinance the liabilities of commercial banks. The situation of central banks 
is quite different. Though they may incur losses and become insolvent – have a negative equity –, they 
will not face the same risk of a run. Central banks supply a public good (banknotes and reserves) over 
which they have a monopoly power. Commercial banks need to hold a current account in the central 
bank and all clearing operations in the banking system are realized with those reserves. Central banks 
also issue banknotes having a legal tender so that a payment realized with banknotes cannot be 
refused. Even if the central bank incurs losses and if it is recognized that central bank is insolvent, there 
is no bankruptcy procedure (Reis, 2016) and it can still continue to issue reserves and banknotes. A 
confidence crisis will not trigger a run. The first consequence of it is that potential losses reduce the 
revenues distributed to the government. Finally, Corradin, Heider and Hoerova (2017) argue that 
collateral policies have their own weaknesses: the markets they are securing via the supply of high-
quality collateral may be prone to amplification and contagion effects via changes in the price of the 
collaterals, more importantly when they are scarce or illiquid. The extension of collaterals by the ECB 
has exactly limited these two risks and made the set of collaterals more abundant and liquid.    
Consequently, the risk taken by the Eurosystem related to the collateral policy should not be 
overestimated. First, it would materialize into losses if a counterparty – a commercial bank – did not 
repay its loans and if the value of collateral suddenly and sharply collapsed to a value below the amount 
of the loan. Losses would then be shared among national central banks according to the key for 
subscription to the ECB's capital. Finally national central banks could be recapitalized by their own 
                                                             
3  There were also examples of market participants issuing their own assets to be used as collateral in Eurosystem liquidity 
operations (Corradin et al., 2017). As of March 2015 though, the Eurosystem has phased-out the possibility of obtaining a 
government guarantee on banks’ own-name assets.    
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governments. Otherwise, they could still issue money. Consequently, the potential risk of collateral 
policy most probably does not exceed the benefits in terms of monetary policy transmission. Does it 
mean that central banks can indefinitely operate with negative equity and that the insolvency risk does 
not matter for monetary policy? Even if there is no formal bankruptcy for central banks, they may 
become insolvent in an economic sense. Insolvency will not lead to a standard run but agents will try 
to get rid of domestic currency as soon of possible. The consequences would be a decrease in the real 
value of the monetary base, hence an increase of inflation (see Buiter, 2008). Under current 
circumstances and keeping in mind the mandate of the ECB, the inflation risk is limited. 
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 CONCLUSION 
This policy brief has dealt with the effect of the collateral policy implemented by the ECB. From the 
early stage of EMU, the ECB decided to accept a large set of assets as collateral in liquidity operations. 
This decision mainly stems from the characteristics of the European financial system, which is more 
bank-oriented. Banks have been severely hit by the financial crises in the euro area triggering a liquidity 
squeeze. Banks were unable to access funding in the interbank market and have then turned to the 
ECB. While collateral is generally not needed between commercial banks, it is required for refinancing 
operations with the ECB. Collateral policy has therefore become a crucial issue.  
During the crisis, the ECB introduced several changes in its collateral framework. It has notably reduced 
the minimum required rating for several class of assets. The aim was to make sure that commercial 
banks suffering liquidity shortages could still access enough central bank liquidity. While the 
Eurosystem has taken over more risk, these decisions also contributed to enhance the accommodation 
of monetary policy. Recent studies have highlighted the positive effect of collateral policy on lending. 
The large set of assets accepted for collateral may have also supported liquidity on the financial market 
and thus some asset prices. Yet, this may have made the balance sheet of the Eurosystem riskier as 
loans have been granted to weaker counterparties against weaker collateral. However, those risks 
should be over-estimated. First, for losses to be effective, not only should the counterparty fail but, the 
ECB should be unable to recover the funds in the market. The counterparty and the market risk need 
to materialize at the same time. Moreover, central banks do not run the same business as commercial 
banks. There is no insolvency procedure for central banks and they are not prone to runs as they issue 
the legal tender and may continue their activity even if they have negative equity. The main risk in case 
of losses would be that central banks expand their balance sheet so massively that it would raise 
inflation in the future. The probability of such a possibility is very low. 
The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing monetary policy transmission has 
most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance sheet and potential capital 
losses.  
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Questions:  
• Does the Governing Council intend to tighten its collateral framework when it ends its quantitative 
easing policy in December 2018?  
• Since the collateral framework affects demand and prices for eligible assets, does the Governing 
Council intend to add this policy to the standard toolkit of monetary policymakers? 
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During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to face increased liquidity needs of 
commercial banks. This has taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different classes of 
assets has been reduced and the haircut associated to these assets has evolved conditional on the 
default risks of these assets. The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing 
monetary policy transmission have most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank 
balance sheet and potential capital losses. 
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